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Abstract 
 
Elections are a prime concern for democracy. The study of 
elections and electoral systems becomes important in 
understanding how a political system will function. On the other 
hand, an anti-democratic political culture can distort democratic 
institutions. Thus one might wonder whether it really matters 
more which electoral system a country adopts or what political 
culture there is in that country. We argue that beside the 
constitutional arrangements and reformulating its electoral 
system and mechanism, an un-democratic culture of 
authoritarianism has underpinned much of Albanian political 
activity lately. The latter has been the prime cause of the lack of 
consolidation of Albanian democracy and not its institutions. Two 
empirical snapshots of the most important Albanian recent 
political events are delineated in order to understand the intricate 
mechanisms of institutions and political culture in shaping and re-
shaping the political system. 
 
1. Introduction
1
 
 
The process of democratization became one of the most central 
political questions of the post-transition period in Central Eastern 
European countries. The main challenge towards democratization 
of the region was the creation of new institutions to guarantee 
the separation of the state from party control. Other fundamental 
reforms and new legal and administrative practices had to be 
                                                
1The authors are grateful to the two anonymous reviewers of this journal for 
their useful comments and suggestions. 
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introduced, in order to break up with the institutional legacies of 
communism. Although the region faced common challenges, the 
developments of the democratization process in Central Eastern 
Europe were diverse. Studies have shown very different patterns 
of progress toward establishing a democratic regime where the 
Central European region is given as a picture of successful 
transition to democracy while the Balkans portrait is characterized 
by a number of setbacks.
2
 Moreover, even among the Balkan 
countries, there are peculiarities and particularities of the 
democratization process. For example Albania is often regarded 
as a “most difficult case of democratisation or usually treated as 
an outlier compared to other post-communist experiences of 
regime change.”
3
 What makes the Albanian case even more 
puzzling is the fact that it has not experienced the ethnic strife 
and the long and hazardous process of nation-building that was 
the case elsewhere in the Western Balkans region. Thus, it had 
fewer predispositions to falling behind in the democratization 
process, which is becoming a marathon even by regional 
standards. For this purpose it is relevant and important to study 
the often overlooked case of Albania and analyze what makes this 
country a rather hard case for successful democracy transitioning. 
The insights that will derive from such analysis can be telling for 
similar cases, as well as provide explanations for transitioning 
difficulties in the Western Balkans, the ‘back door’ of European 
Union. 
 
This paper identifies the kind of democracy Albania experiences, 
with reference not only to political institutions but also to political 
culture. What we suggest here is that beside the constitutional 
                                                
2 On the different patterns of progress toward democratization in Eastern 
Europe see Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Regional Organizations, Political 
Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe”, East 
European Politics and Societies 21(1) (2007): 126–141. For a ten-year 
assessment of the transition process and a comparison between the Balkans and 
the Central European countries see: Jacques Rupnik, “Eastern Europe: the 
International Context”, Journal of Democracy 11(2) (2000): 115-129. 
3Arolda Elbasani, “EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism – 
Reforming Public Administration in Albania ”, L'Europe en Formation: Revue 
d'études sur la construction européenne et le fédéralisme / Journal of Studies on 
European Integration and Federalism 349-350 (2008): 125. 
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arrangements and reformulating its electoral system and 
mechanism, an un-democratic culture of authoritarianism has 
underpinned much of Albanian political activity. The latter has 
been the primary cause of the unconsolidated Albanian 
democracy and not its institutions. The paper covers these issues 
by firstly bringing up theoretical considerations on the 
consolidation of democracy. Then, two empirical snapshots of two 
of the most important Albanian recent political events are 
delineated in order to understand the intricate mechanisms of 
institutions and political culture in shaping and re-shaping the 
political system. The methodology focuses on discourse analysis 
and an epistemological and ontological treatment of primary and 
secondary sources to study how this ‘new’ culture of 
authoritarianism has pervaded the democracy transitioning 
process and what it has to say about the role and functioning of 
the institutions. 
 
2. Democratization, ‘Transitiology’ and Countries (Caught) 
in Between  
 
The process of democratization and the transition experienced in 
between is by no means a sui generis process in which Albania 
finds itself as an island. Quite on the contrary, in many regards 
Albania faces the same obstacles, and as well as ‘stalled’ progress 
experienced in most of the region. Below we refer to a conceptual 
apparatus offered in the form of a critique by Thomas Carothers 
in a seminal article of his, when criticizing the long- dominating 
‘transitologists’, such as Schmitter and O`Donnell. The ‘End of 
Transition Paradigm’ takes into analyses the transition paradigm 
that came to dominate the democratization school from the early 
1990s, with Huntington’s thesis of a ‘third wave’ of democracy. 
The so-called ‘transitology’ school was particularly influenced by 
the work of O`Donnell and Schmitter who essentially coined the 
term and prescribed a set of core assumptions that are generally 
supposed to hold when a country is transiting from an autocratic 
rule toward a democratic form of regime.
4
 A critique of this 
                                                
4Guillermo O`Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1986). The five core assumptions that have served to 
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“three-part process of democratization consisting of opening, 
break-through, and consolidation” that never runs so smooth in 
reality has emerged in an influential piece by Carothers,
5
 where 
he addresses the shortcomings that most transition countries 
experience in the long and hazardous road to democracy. 
 
What Carothers duly observes is that most transitory countries in 
today’s world do not fit in this black and white picture because 
they are caught somewhere in the middle. This fact, according to 
the author, is often overlooked by most indicators serving as 
measurements of the level of democracy in the world, in 
compatibility with the criteria established by the above set of 
assumptions. In order to address what he believes is the end of 
the transition paradigm because it has outlasted its ‘theoretical 
life’, Carothers proposes a new assumption that refers to the 
middle-ground between ‘full-fledged democracies and outright 
dictatorships’ and which “is actually the most common political 
condition today of countries in the developing world and the post 
communist world.”
6
 The overall scholarly discussion on the post-
transition period in Eastern Europe is going beyond the old 
dichotomy of democratic and authoritarian classification. Many 
scholarly attempts have been put forward in order to search for 
more accurate and descriptive concepts which can be referred to 
as “democracy with adjectives”.
7
 Different qualifier adjectives 
have been added to the term democracy, trying to describe such 
unconsolidated regimes as ‘illiberal’, ‘near polyarchies’, ‘semi-
democratic’ or more generally, ‘hybrid’ regimes. Aside from the 
                                                                                                             
define the transition paradigm range from automaticity of the process of 
transformation itself; countries that are transiting usually follow a “three-part 
process of democratization consisting of opening, break-through, and 
consolidation’; free election will intrinsically guarantee greater participation and 
accountability; political elites` will and determination prevail over the 
‘underlying economic, social, and institutional conditions and legacies,” which 
have little effect over their way of thinking and that state-building is an 
epiphenomenon to democracy-building and “largely compatible with it.” 
5Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of 
Democracy 13(1) (2002): 17. 
6 Ibid., 18 
7David Collier and Steven Levitsky “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49(3) (1997): 430-451. 
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many labels, their point is that such regimes are caught in 
between as they share both democratic and authoritarian 
elements simultaneously. 
 
Our opinion is that the substantive argument of regimes caught in 
between democracy and authoritarianism put forward by 
scholars, besides its multiple labels, is strongly convincing and in 
addition, matches the political reality of Albania. The underlying 
idea of this argument is that although democratic institutions may 
be in place, there is a lack of democratic behaviour.  
 
3. Democratization: A Question of Political Culture or 
Political Institutions? 
 
Democratization in the post communist countries required first of 
all the creation of new democratic institutions to guarantee the 
separation of the state from party control. Furthermore, other 
fundamental reforms and new legal and administrative practices 
had to be introduced, in order to break with the institutional 
legacies of communism. In such an institutionalist perspective, 
the emphasis is put on the formal aspects of democracy, where 
the existence of formally democratic political institutions is very 
important for the development of democracy. According to 
supporters of political institutionalism it is enough that the 
democratic institutions and the set of rules are in place. It is 
especially in societies that demonstrate a great plurality of 
political interest and views, where the institutions become 
essential. In order to reflect such plurality of interests and better 
represent them, a proper set of rules are needed. The mechanism 
of how the votes will be translated into seats in the assembly 
becomes crucial. From such an institutionalist point of view, 
elections and their set of rules become main concerns of 
democracy. Studying elections and electoral systems becomes 
important in understanding how the political system will function. 
But is this enough to let us grasp the whole picture? Tagapeera 
notices that: “[e]lectoral systems affect politics, but they are also 
products of politics”
8
 and as such, an anti-democratic political 
                                                
8Rein Taagepera “How electoral systems matter for democratization”, 
Democratization 5(3) (1998): 7. 
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culture can distort a democratic institution. This happens mostly 
in countries that previously have had severe totalitarian regimes 
(as in the case of communist Albania was), who may find it 
difficult to set up a legitimate democratic system, since changing 
their traditions and political culture takes longer than changing 
institutions. Thus one might wonder whether it really matters so 
much which electoral system a country adopts or what political 
culture exists is in the country. 
 
We would like to turn now to the empirics, and through snapshots 
that look at two important events in Albanian politics, we 
investigate where the current Albanian political system stands 
with reference to the two above mentioned pillars (political 
institutions and political culture) and how this influences the 
democratization process. In other words, what is the role of the 
Albanian political class and how are institutions and political 
culture are playing each other out? Which of the two has the 
upper hand in the political game and how it is it demonstrated in 
political outcomes, such as elections and electoral reforms? 
 
Many Albanian political events could be used as illustrative 
examples of the democratization processes, but as space does 
not allow us to discuss each of them in-depth, we would like to 
focus our analysis on two important cases: the election of the 
new president and the reform of the electoral system. These two 
cases will be treated in detail, although other cases may also be 
used as examples of the growing authoritarianism in the country. 
The same can be said about the judiciary system, given the 
appointment of a new prosecutor-general affiliated with the ruling 
party or dubious appointments to the highest legal body, the 
Supreme Justice Council, which is in charge of the appointments 
of judges. All these have made both the civil society and 
opposition suspicious of a growing authoritarianism. 
 
4. First Snapshot: Election of the new President   
 
Not long ago, instead of a former consensual president, elected 
by bi-partisan agreement in the Parliament of 2002, the new 
president was until recently the vice-chairman of the ruling party. 
Apart from being seen as threatening to the general democratic 
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standards of the country by the opposition much of the civil 
society and media, the election of the vice-chairman of the 
biggest party (that already controlled the other important 
institutions as well)
9
 to the post of President of Republic, it also 
endangers the bi-partisan consensual mood that is needed to 
push forward with ‘big’ reforms, such as that of judiciary, 
electoral code, propriety rights and so on. The former president 
was elected as a result of a general agreement between the 
former Socialist government and the Democratic Party, which 
then constituted the opposition. The deal was brokered by OSCE 
and other international institutions (notably European 
Commission delegation in Albania and the US Embassy), which 
were interested mostly in preserving the stability and reducing 
the political fragmentation, rather than emphasizing the 
democratic credentials of such consensual bargaining. Naturally, 
the Socialists, now in opposition, expected the same ‘courtesy’ 
gesture by the Democrats and probably were hoping for a timely 
intervention of international bodies to help reach a new 
agreement. But the situation was not the same as in 2001, and 
this time through a series of shady mechanisms and through 
methods of co-optation of some unsatisfied members of the 
opposition, the majority (which is constituted by the Democratic 
Party and its allies), succeeded in electing the new president from 
their own ranks.
10
 This had three prime consequences. 
                                                
9As a footnote of clarification here, the problem with this election laid especially 
in the opposition's growing fear that the majority with this move secured the 
‘trinity’ of the most important institutions, that of prime minister, head of 
parliament and the president. This not only changed the ‘rules of the game’ 
agreed to  only four year prior, under the supervision of international actors, but 
moreover increased the power of the Democratic Party to easily replace the 
heads of other (state) institutions with members affiliated either directly or 
indirectly with this party. Since the law for civil officials is rarely enforced in 
Albanian politics, the coming to power of one political force implies the hiring of 
its militants in place of the existing ones. Seen in this light, the fears of 
opposition were not entirely unfounded. 
10There were several suspicions that made the round of press (mostly raised by 
the Socialist Party members) that some opposition members of parliament were 
bribed or co-opted in other forms to suddenly switch their position and vote with 
the majority for the new non-consensual president. In light of some 
circumstanced evidence, such suspicions had some valid basis. 
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First, it further alienated the opposition and ‘froze’ the ‘big’ 
reforms for an indefinite time, because most of these reforms 
require a 3/5 quorum, which was impossible to reach without the 
opposition. Second, all calls for a referendum in electing the new 
president were ridiculed and there was very little transparency in 
the election of the new president. This disappointed a large part 
of the population, which as several polls indicated, were deeply 
dissatisfied by the whole process, although generally the new 
president, Bamir Topi, was well liked and respected as a 
moderate and one of the most voted-for and popular politicians in 
the country.
11
 The problem laid in the way that he was elected. 
Third, all calls for a popular referendum were ignored and 
moreover, the citizens were deprived of any kind of resolution 
that would have solved the impasse and at the same time allow 
for a degree of peoples` participation. However, yet another 
problem laid with the moment of election itself. 
 
As soon as the new president was elected, the international 
institutions that had so that far opposed any kind of resolution 
that would not involve the opposition rushed to congratulate the 
new president and offered no criticism at all of the highly 
suspicious process. Furthermore, the new political developments 
had undermined the previous precedent of bi-partisan consensus 
for the election of the president, while not offering any other 
(democratic) alternatives. Even more surprising is that after the 
decision was reached and the country had now a new president-
elect, which paraphrasing Derrida is the climax of ‘the political’, a 
period of de-politicization soon followed, with most of the salient 
political issues being sidelined. These issues were the reform 
amendments that previously were discussed to be included in a 
common package with the election of the president. That was to 
be the big compromise, but with the presidential election of 
President already fait accompli, the government lost its incentive 
and saw cooperation with the opposition as redundant. Seen in 
this light, the ‘political’ becomes the moment that de-politicizes 
                                                
11Several polls, published in the Albanian press at the time in fact indicated 
that Mr. Topi was the most favored candidate for the post of president and if an 
election would have taken place, he was favored to win by a landslide. 
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and moves away from public discourse, the contestation of salient 
political issues. International actors had undoubtedly played a 
great role in the process, albeit mostly by default, given their 
prominent position as arbiter in the process and the legacy of 
past intervention. Their failure to prevent a unilateral move that 
threatened the political willingness of the opposition and alienated 
large parts of civil society and the press guaranteed short-term 
stability, but threatened the processes of further democratization, 
by ignoring the ‘fair play’ rules which they themselves had helped 
broker. This undermined their legitimacy, as well as the 
legitimacy of the Albanian political class and led to a growing 
alienation of the public, making the public more willing to 
withdraw from political participation.
12
 
 
5. The Second Snapshot: Re-reforming the Electoral 
System  
 
One of the hottest recent debates boils around the necessary 
reform of the electoral code, which has been a controversial issue 
in the Albanian political sphere for most of its transition period. 
Some background information is needed here to better 
understand the current political debate around the issue of which 
electoral system would better represent the interests of Albanian 
citizens and increase representation, while reducing irregularities 
in (general) elections.  
 
Most of the Albanian post-communist elections (except the 1991-
1992), have been characterized as having irregularities ranging 
from neglect to outright theft of votes.  International observers, 
especially the ones from OSCE, have always rated Albanian 
elections as problematic, partially free or generally regular and 
                                                
12As the election for the depute seat to fill President Topi's parliamentarian 
seat, less than 40 percent of citizens of that Tirana district actually voted, 
although it was one of the most important electoral zones in the country and the 
political parties campaigned hard for that seat. In the long run, we fear that an 
even larger number of people would simply refrain from voting, let alone other 
(more active) forms of political participation, as a general distrust with behind-
the door bureaucratized politics that rely mostly on having their actions 
approved by internationals rather than their own constituencies. 
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free, but with minor problems.
13
 But even when international 
observers have accepted elections as generally in line with 
democratic standards, such as the general elections of 1996, the 
opposition has protested the results.  Such was the case in the 
general elections of 1996, when the Democratic Party, headed by 
former President and current Prime Minister Sali Berisha, rejected 
the results outright and protested massively in defiance of the 
rigged results.
14
 In 1997 it was Berisha`s turn to denounce the 
Socialist Party for rigging the votes outright. But, at least until 
2001, the debate was primarily focused on questions of the 
legitimacy of elections, lack of security and rigged results. In 
2001, however, the debate shifted somewhat, for the first time 
revolving primarily around the questions of loopholes in the 
electorate code that allowed for deformed results. The reason was 
that since the electorate code followed closely the German 
system, which is ‘corrected majoritarian,’ it meant that 100 
deputies out of 140 would be elected directly, while the other 
forty through proportional lists. The Socialist Party which had 
secured a small but necessary majority already, in the second 
round,
15
 urged its potential voters to vote for coalition parties, 
which secured enough percentage to be represented in the 140 
seats parliament and to artificially increase the weight of the 
governing bloc vis-à-vis opposition. 
                                                
13See for example the OSCE report of 1997 that qualifies the 1997 elections as 
‘admissible for the moment.”  Raporti i OSBE-ODIHR per zgjedhjet e 29 
qershorit 1997” [The OSCE-ODIHR report for 29 July, 1997 elections], cited in 
Henri Cili, “Nderkombetaret si Pala e Trete: Nje Udhetim Bashke me 
Nderkombetaret neper Trazicionin Shqiptar 1990-2002” (The international 
actors as a third party: A trip with the internationals in the Albanian transition 
1990-2002). Polis 4 (2007): 51. 
14The Democratic Party won 122 seats in a 140 members` parliament and 
nobody could doubt the scale of irregularities, except the OSCE or EU observers, 
who due to political considerations, closed an eye and declared the elections as 
generally free, with few misconducts and irregularities. 
15There was only one round of elections, but in some villages and towns the 
elections took place later than scheduled due to administrative issues. As an 
anecdotal note, the small village of Dushku became the most famous Albanian 
village ever, because it ‘produced’ several deputes, due to the fact the Socialists 
urged their voters to vote for coalition parties that needed only a few 
percentage points to reach the quorum and be represented in the parliament. 
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In the 2005 general elections, the same story was repeated in 
even a larger scale, with the Democratic Party this time 
performing better, due to better organizational skills and use of 
the system. However, the third biggest party, the Socialist Party 
for Integration, headed by former prime minister, Ilir Meta, 
strongly contested the results, which he (as well as foreign 
observers and international organizations, such as OSCE), 
declared did not represent the will of the Albanian people. 
Moreover, the composition of the new parliament was really 
paradoxical, with parties that before had barely reached the 
threshold, now having ten or eleven deputes. On the other hand, 
the deputes that were elected directly represented only one of the 
two biggest parties (Democratic or Socialist Party) and were often 
perceived as shady businessmen who had either bought the votes 
outright or outspent their opponents by means of personal 
investment in their own campaigns. Together these factors led to 
a rising number of calls from international bodies (such as US 
Department of State, OSCE or EU), as well as some political 
parties and segments of civil society, to amend the electoral 
system in order to have a fairer representation of popular vote 
and democratic will. 
 
After many ad hominem attacks and counter-attacks between the 
two main political parties, in a seemingly abrupt move they 
agreed to move forward with a new proposal that would 
drastically change the current electoral system. They have even 
appointed an electoral commission, headed by two high officials 
of their respective parties, and are in the final phase of reaching a 
deal to the detriment and fury of small parties in either camp. 
The proposed electoral code suits the so-called ‘Spanish system,’ 
which basically means a ‘regional proportional’ system. Without 
going into technicalities, or why the small parties are deeply 
dissatisfied with this plan that threatens their existence, I want to 
shortly present why this new system threatens a growing de-
politicization of the public sphere and how international factors, 
notably OSCE, are involved in the process.  
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After the fall of communism, Albania adopted a mix electoral 
system.
16
 As one author put it, Albania has copy/pasted the 
German variation of a mixed system.
17
 In April 2008 the new law 
passed in parliament by the rare consensus of the Democratic 
and Socialist Parties with 115 votes pro (requiring at least 94 
votes in the 140-seat parliament). The new voting rules made 
possible the constitutional amendments. Under such changes the 
majority to elect the president was notably reduced. Now, 
Albania's president, instead of its previous minimum of 3/5 (83) 
of the deputies, can be elected by a simple majority (only 
50%+1, 71 votes) in the fourth round of voting.
18
 
 
While regarding the electoral system the law gives voting system 
greater proportional representation. Albania has passed from the 
mix (a partial majority) system in favor of a regional proportional 
representation (fashioned around the Spanish system), within 
each of Albania's 12 administrative regions. All 140 members of 
parliament will in the future be elected by regional proportional 
representation from party lists. Most European countries have 
their electoral systems based on Proportional Representation 
were the seats in a constituency are divided according to the 
number of votes cast for party lists.  
 
In the Albanian case, under the new electoral engineering the 
party lists will be open and the ranking subsequently cannot be 
changed in principle. Nevertheless, the critics point out the fact 
that it empowers political leaders' grip on their respective parties, 
since they are the highest authority in deciding who is included in 
                                                
16For a review of previous electoral system changes in post-communist Albania 
see Arolda Elbasani, “Mixed Member Electoral Systems in Transition Contexts: 
How Has the System Worked in Albania?” CEU Political Science Journal 3(1) 
2008: 79-82. 
17Ibid., 73. 
18Other changes included limiting the prosecutor general's term to five years, 
forcing an early election in the case of a no-confidence vote and reducing the 
majority required to elect the president from three-fifths to half the MPs. Also, 
Albania's prosecutor general will have a fixed five-year term instead of an 
unlimited one; and parliament will automatically be dissolved and early elections 
declared if the government loses a confidence vote. 
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these lists. One of the under-publicized elements of this new 
proposed deal is that it plans a ‘closed lists’ system, which means 
that the public can vote only for the party, without having any 
choice in electing their favorite candidate. The candidates are 
ranked beforehand by the respective leaders in these closed lists 
and they will take their seats according to the percentage of votes 
that each party receives in general elections. This allows the 
heads of the two biggest parties to give primacy to their clear 
favorites and to rid the party of any opposition, constructive or 
otherwise.  Any dissenters would risk outright expulsion from the 
party list. This would increase the unity of the party around the 
leader, but on the other hand would increase the general public's 
dissatisfaction, as the lists do not offer any choice.  We fear that 
this would lead to a further de-politicization and withdrawal of 
citizens from public sphere.
19
 
 
On top of this, international actors are viewed as independent fair 
players neither by the Albanian political class, nor by different 
societal segments. The OSCE has not been seen as an impartial 
arbiter of this process by various media, civil society or small 
political parties. In a declaration for the media, the spokesperson 
of the Socialist Party, Mimi Kodheli, declared that the Socialist 
Party’s stance is compatible 100 percent with that of OSCE in 
both opposing the open lists that would allow for public scrutiny 
and choice among the candidates.
20
 One can do little but wonder 
why OSCE officially backs a plan proposed by one of the two 
biggest parties and supported by the other, but that largely 
ignores the will of the public, civil society actors and small 
parties? One suggestion offered for public consumption by the 
media that a popular referendum should decide upon this matter, 
has been largely opposed by the two biggest parties and OSCE. 
This partiality noticed in OSCE official stances has made the 
organization especially suspect in the eyes of the small parties. 
Some of these parties, notably the Democratic Alliance (a centre-
right party) and the Social-Democratic Party (a left-centered) 
                                                
19Ilir Kalemaj, “Reforma Zgjedhore dhe Depolitizimi” (The electoral reform and 
depoliticization). Standard daily. March 16, 2008. 
20Balkanweb, Raporti i OSBE. “PS: Kundershtojme listat e hapura,” (OSCE 
Report. “SP: We Oppose the Open Lists) Balkanweb, 02 March, 2008. 
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have publicly called for an end of the mission of OSCE in the 
country.
21
 
 
This second snapshot is clearly telling in regard to the 
ineffectiveness of the institutions, such as electoral reform and 
electoral codes, which when left in the ultimate discretion of the 
main political players can inhibit democracy and democratic 
transition. 
 
6. Additional Factors Needed for Democratization 
 
In Albania the democratic system and the desirability of 
democracy is not disputed. The problem does not rest much on 
the electoral system per se but rather on the way in which politics 
is conducted. In Albania, limited rather than fully pluralist 
competition can be noticed, while elections are often marred by 
intimidation and corruption. If we refer to Freedom House 
surveys Albania can be classified as having, at best, partially free 
and democratic elections.
22
 
 
Almost two decade after the collapse of communism there are still 
authoritarian tendencies in terms of political behaviour. It is the 
party in power (or more often, the individual politicians) who 
takes over the political process and ignores the legislative. The 
country used to go into institutional or political crisis not because 
of lacking institutions (or improper electoral system), but mostly 
because of non-democratic behaviours from the party (or 
individuals) in power. All these disturbances limit the ability of the 
democratic system to function properly.  
                                                
21The head of the Democratic Alliance, Dr. Neritan Ceka stated during a 
television appearance (Opinion Show, December 2007), that the country had 
already reached its political maturity and did not need to be babysat by 
organizations such as OSCE. 
22Albania’s Electoral Process rating remains 3.75 with the worst score 4.50 in 
1998. Nations in Transit ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 
representing the highest level and 7representing the lowest level of democratic 
development. For more see: Freedom House “Freedom in the World: Aggregate 
Scores” access at  
<http://www.freedomhouse.org> 
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The parties’ political culture is still archaic, with little or no 
respect at all for the rule of law.
23
 Manipulation of elections has 
become the norm and the unwritten law of the Albanian electoral 
system. With the exception of the 1992 parliamentary elections, 
all the other elections have been strongly contested by the losing 
party and the international community as well. In their reports we 
usually read that the elections in Albania “complied only partially 
with ... international standards for democratic elections.”
24
 Such 
evaluations leave Albania far from having a consolidated 
democracy on the base of fair competition and free elections. An 
alternation in power was hardly accepted by the governing party 
in the latest 2005 elections. The rotation of power took almost 
three months, creating an institutional vacuum for Albania. 
 
Contested or fragile constitutional arrangements have been key 
features of the Albanian political landscape. The post-communist 
Albanian state had to reformulate its electoral system and 
mechanisms in April 2008. But besides re-adopting such 
democratic institutions, the main challenge is that of getting rid of 
the pervasive un-democratic culture of authoritarianism which 
has underpinned much political activity and which has resulted in 
a weakness in applying the rule of law. Albania has experienced 
difficulty developing a political culture where competition should 
govern all aspects of political life. Even where new laws and new 
mechanisms have been adopted, their implementation remains 
very weak. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
                                                
23For more on the implications of parties and party system in Albanian 
democratic development see: Dorian Jano, “On Parties and Party System in 
Albania: What Implications for Democracy”, in Central European Case Studies, 
eds. Gergely Karácsony and Péter Smuk, (Universitas-Győr Nonprofit Kft.: Győr, 
2008), 85-103. 
24On the latest election of 2005 see: OSCE/ODIHR, Press release “Competitive 
Albanian elections weakened by insufficient political will and system open to 
abuse”, Tirana, 4 July 2005. 
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Albania is still beset by a confrontational political culture where a 
tendency of confrontation and crisis has become the norms of 
Albanian political life. Such a mismatch of authoritarian political 
culture with democratic institutions has raised doubts and 
concerns about the quality of democracy in the country. Having 
the most effective electoral system is not everything, since 
democracy is not simply a machine that once set up, functions by 
itself. It depends on the elite and their political culture which 
should conform to the rules of democratic institutions. As it has 
been discussed so far with reference to the electoral system and 
its reforms, it can be said that it is not so much the (democratic) 
institutions who have framed political elites’ behaviour, but rather 
the opposite. The authoritarian political culture of the Albanian 
political elites has distorted the democratic institutions. As such, 
Albania cannot be considered a consolidated (liberal) democracy. 
Rather it can be argued to be more of a ‘hybrid’ type of 
democracy with democratic institutions but still autocratic political 
behaviour. The latest report of Freedom House also favours such 
an argument, ranking Albania in the ‘hybrid democracies’ 
category. Albania is far from the only former communist country 
placed in this category, but it is an outlier in Central and Eastern 
Europe, being one of the hardest cases of democratization.  
 
This paper sought to understand the deeper context in which 
political activity is embedded and pinpoint the absence of a 
consolidated political culture and institutional framework that 
could duly juxtapose any growing authoritarianism tendencies by 
political actors. After carefully thinking along Carothers` lines of 
discussing the features of these two systems that in fact are not 
too far apart from each other,
25
  we would situate the Albanian 
case mostly at the ‘feckless-pluralist’ side, since it conforms to 
many of its features, like political freedom, regular elections and 
alternation of power. Or to put it differently, it subscribes to most 
                                                
25Carothers (2002) distinguishes further between hybrid regimes. He labels 
‘feckless populism’ regimes that have considerable pluralism and competitive 
electoral processes but still shallow and troublesome democracy and ‘dominant-
power politics’ regimes that although they have some space for political 
competition, are still dominated by one grouping leaving little prospect for a real 
alternation of power. 
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of Dahl’s seven characteristics of ‘polyarchy.’
26
 The real political 
participation nevertheless extends little beyond voting and there 
is not a true representation of various strata of population in 
policy-making. On the other hand, lately Albania has also seen 
some disturbing signs of moving toward a ‘dominant-power’ 
system, where the lines between the state and the ruling party 
are becoming blurry.  
 
While the institutional architecture of a country can be changed 
relatively quickly through amending the constitution or adopting a 
new one, political behavior is difficult to change and takes time. It 
may take many years to build a democratic political culture. That 
institutions matter in a democracy is not to be denied but the 
question remains how much do they matter and in what context 
they are set. “There is a consensus in this literature that no 
‘perfect’ bespoke electoral system fits every democracy. Instead, 
arrangements have to be tailored to each particular context; and 
choices involve trade-offs”.
27
 The complex picture of the Albanian 
political reality needs to consider both political institutionalism 
and political cultures.  
 
For the consolidation of democracy “institutions should be 
congruent with political culture”.
28
 Democratisation therefore 
involves not only reforming the electoral system but also making 
the electoral process more democratic (competitive and 
depersonalised). Albania urgently needs to guarantee fully 
functioning democratic institutions and foster a more democratic 
political culture. It is not much the relevance of the electoral 
system choices that matter but rather the democratic context 
                                                
26These characteristics, according to Dahl are: “elected officials, free    and fair 
elections, inclusive suffrage, and the right to run for office, freedom of 
expression, alternative information and associational  autonomy” Robert Dahl, 
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale: Yale University Press, 1972) 221. 
27Pippa Norris “Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic 
Conflict, Electoral Systems, and Democratization”, in The Architecture of 
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, 
Andrew Reynolds (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 209. 
28 Harry Eckstein cited in Rein Taagepera “How electoral systems matter for 
democratization” 5(3) (1998): 68. 
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elections are developing. In speaking about democratization one 
has to take into considerable account not only on the presence 
and level of democratic institutions but also on the way in which 
politics is conducted there. Consolidated democracies need not 
only democratic institutions; above all they need democratic 
culture. 
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